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1. Abstract 
 
This essay is part of the Dissertation thesis in the Master’s in Information and 
Communication Technology of the International Hellenic University. It involves an 
overview of USB storage technologies and methods of analyzing digital forensics of 
those portable devices. It mainly focuses on the pod slurping attack and techniques 
to detect it in a Microsoft Windows environment. Based on these techniques, an 
application is created that examines a Windows system and assesses the possibility 
of a pod slurping attack in a system. 
 The subject is inspired by a paper published by Th. Kavalaris and V. Katos: “On 
the detection of pod slurping attacks” *5+.  The latter is also supervising the Dissertation 
which is intended to be a follow up thesis on the above paper.  
 
2. Introduction 
 
The Universal Serial Bus is a de facto standard for interfacing between a 
computer and a mobile device. USB flush drives, USB hard disks, memory cards 
connecting via memory readers and mobile phones are just a few typical examples of 
devices that utilize the USB protocol. All of the above are treated by operating 
systems and computers in a “Universal” way. This makes forensics analysts treat the 
analysis of those devices in the same way.  
After reviewing technologies and issues regarding the USB interface, its 
forensic traces and ways to discover it, the essay focuses on the pod slurping attack. 
The pod slurping attack stems its name from the fist device that this kind of attack 
was introduced, the iPod. The iPod is a device produced by Apple able to reproduce 
music from digital media. It is portable, small and one can use it to listen to music 
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even while he is jogging. iPod has a memory to store the music files which are 
usually copied from a conventional personal computer. The interface between the 
two is based on the USB standard. Another interesting fact for USB devices is that 
they use the same USB port not only to communicate data but to transmit power 
needed for the device to work and charge its batteries. This feature adds indeed to 
the “Universal” purpose of the USB interface, which was designed to be a “one for 
all” solution for mobile devices. The iPod became very popular and many accessories 
were introduced to the market to facilitate it. 
The pod slurping attack is done if the software is altered in a way that instead 
of just charging or interchanging files, it is able to “slurp” (that is copy to it) files and 
data from the host PC. Pretending that he wants to charge his iPod, the attacker can 
copy to the iPod files, photographs and data giving no clue to the victim. Of course, 
this kind of attack is now done with much more devices than the iPod. 
At the second part of the Dissertation an application is introduced which is 
able to detect a pod slurping attack. The application utilizes a wizard-like 
environment, collecting data both from the operating system (OS) and the user. It 
then exploits the traces left over to the OS of a PC by the pod slurping attack. Finally 
it is able to inform the user whether he is a victim of such an attack with some 
degree of certainty. The time period between the attack and the investigation is 
crucial for the reliability of the application’s outcome.  
Finally the essay stresses some drawbacks that a pod slurping detection 
technique might have together with anti-forensic ways that one may use to cover his 
tracks.  
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3. Literature Review 
 
The use of computers and its accessories has been growing exponentially in 
the last decades. While businesses and professionals benefit from the computational 
power and memorizing capacity of modern computers, outlaws and cons also 
facilitate new technologies to achieve their goals. It is widely understood among law 
enforcement agencies around the world that digital forensics is becoming more and 
more important and a lot of forensics’ scientists are focusing on computer 
investigation. However, computer accessories have been remarkably neglected from 
such research. 
3.1 Live vs. Dead Forensics 
 
Digital Forensics is defined as  “the process of copying data from a computer 
in a forensic manner” [13].  A more descriptive definition is given by the US-CERT 
team which defines computer forensics as “the discipline that combines elements of 
law and computer science to collect and analyze data from computer systems, 
networks, wireless communications and storage devices in a way that is admissible 
as evidence in a court of law” *14].    
Forensics acquisition includes transferring the data from the crime scene to a 
safe location and in a safe storage so they can be analyzed without being 
contaminated. The scope of the forensic analysts stops when interpretation of the 
gathered data is involved [15].  
Digital forensics are divided in “Live” and “Dead” or conventional forensics. 
Live are the forensics gathered from systems that are in use at the time of the 
forensic investigation. That includes computers that are in use, mobile phones, live 
networks etc. Dead forensics are more straightforward and more documented. It 
regards acquiring forensic data from a non operative system at the time of the 
investigation. 
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In both cases the scope of the forensic investigation is to acquire the 
evidence without altering the original source. Furthermore any investigator should 
be able to verify that the evidence is the same as the original. 
Traditional forensics approach is simple and straightforward. The investigator 
determines whether the system is on or off. If the system is on then he powers it off 
with the predefined way or by pulling the plug. Then he removes the hard drive and 
attaches it to an external drive and copies it contents without modifying the original 
hard disk. 
 
Fig. 3-1 Traditional (Dead) forensics approach [13] 
The traditional approach has some limitations that are now considered 
important. Firstly, shutting down or, even worse, pulling the plug leads to data 
alternation or data loss, specifically data which resides in the main memory. 
Secondly no network data are being saved. Data such as open network ports which is 
becoming valuable forensic information is lost when a system is powered down. 
When a system is powered on then a different approach should be followed 
in order to preserve information that would be lost if the system is unplugged. When 
the investigator investigates a live system he has to select whether he will perform a 
local or a network analysis. Both options have advantages over the other. He then 
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chooses weather he wants to conduct the investigation overtly or covertly. After that 
he  attaches an external hard drive to copy the content of the storage media. 
 
Fig. 3-2 Live forensics analysis [15] 
A number of issues have to be dealt in live forensics. If the current user does 
not have administrative rights then the work of investigation becomes more 
complex. Furthermore, a lot of computers have virtual machines running in them 
which need a special approach since both the host and the guest machine has to be 
investigated. However, data modification is the most prominent concern when 
investigating a live system.  
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3.2 Forensics standards and principles 
 
ACPO’s “Good Practice Guide for Computer Based Electronic Evidence” is a 
worldwide standard in digital forensics investigation. It is explicitly stated, its 
purpose is to define methodologies for preserving data mainly in standalone 
computers, leaving other media such as USB Flash Drives in a second place [1][2]. 
However, practices and especially principles defined are universally applied to all 
digital media. 
Four principles are defined that have to be followed, so that evidence are 
preserved and are usable in court. The first principle states that no evidence has to 
be altered by any law enforcement agency. That practically means that firstly some 
procedures have to be followed, with respect to the nature of the media, so that 
evidence will not accidentally be altered. Secondly, some low level technical 
procedures have to take place in order to copy data in another media and conduct 
the investigation on that so that the one found in the scene investigation remain 
intact. It is necessary to mention that the mere startup or connection of a device 
may alter much of its storage, since all operating systems write a lot of information 
without the user’s explicit consent. These may include, access times, dates, event 
logs etc. 
The second principle defines the possibility of an exception to the first 
principle. In exceptional circumstances an investigator might decide that is more 
important to break the first principle for the sake of evidence preservation. 
Sometimes, an immediate action has to be taken so that no evidence is destroyed. 
That might be a working computer, or even worse a computer in the process of 
deleting valuable data. In such a case the guide allows the alternation of data but it is 
stated that agents should have a concrete reason for doing so. 
The third principle states that all actions should be documented in an audit 
trail. This trail could later be used to assess the conformity to ACPO’s principles and 
law restrictions. The series of events are crucial since digital data are easily changed. 
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The documentation of actions is a profound characteristic of a serious and dedicated 
law enforcement team.  
Lastly, the fourth principle of the ACPO’s Guide refers to a person who has to 
be in charge of the scene investigation. The case officer should supervise the 
investigation team and make sure that all actions comply with regulations and 
principles [1].  
3.3 USB forensics 
 
Although there is some research on how to collect evidence from small 
device with volatile memory such as UFDs (USB Flush Drives), there is no 
standardized methodology or best practices available. An effort to make a complete 
guide for collecting forensics evidence from portable devices has been done by the 
U.S. National Institute for Standards and Technology [3]. The Guide covers the also 
fast growing market of PDA and mobile phones. A lot of mobile phones have 
computing capabilities and operate using different Operating Systems, similar to 
standalone computers. It also includes procedures for the preservation and 
collection of evidence from PDAs and software tools used for portable devices. Some 
references include the use of USB Flash Drives, but only in relation to PDAs. 
 
Fig. 3-3 Typical USB storage media 
As soon as the vulnerabilities of the USB devices were revealed, 
countermeasures were also proposed to deal with USB security. Some methods are 
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introduced by Nick Cavalancia [6]. Data theft is serious incident in a business and it 
should not be dealt with isolated measures rather than applying a security strategy 
throughout the enterprise. Workarounds to the problem of data theft by using USB 
devices include physically disabling or locking USB ports disabling the use of USB 
ports by the Operating System. A better policy is to install software that monitors 
and logs USB connection activity, so that forensics data are being preserved. 
The risks from the use of USB Devices are summarized in [7] by 
Marwan Al­Zarouni. USB devices were not able to steal any data from the host 
computer because no application could run without the consent of the user. 
However, things changed dramatically with the introduction of the U3 technology 
which later became a standard for many of the USB devices. U3 implements an 
autorun feature that tries to make portable not only data and files, but applications 
as well. When a U3 enabled device is plugged in, an autorun program runs and 
installs U3 functionality in the host computer just like the CDs autorun feature.  
U3 was easily exploited by hackers to be used for non-legitimate uses. The 
change of the initial .iso file could turn U3 in a pod slurping application [7]. Instead of 
running the U3 Launchpad it would copy files from the host computer. Ways of 
dealing with such threats are physically restricting USB ports, informing the 
employees-users, disabling the autorun feature, restricting access rights and anti-
virus protection. 
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4. The pod slurping attack 
 
The iPod was released in 2001 by Apple was a digital, portable media player 
able to playback digitally encoded music. The first three generations were connected 
via FireWire cable. The fourth generation became compliant with the widely adopted 
USB connectors. Its size and style made it an immediate commercial success.  
 
Fig. 4-1 The fourth generation of the iPod and the first one with USB as a main 
connection interface. 
Soon after its release security concerns were also raised. Security expert, Abe 
Usher [8] claimed in 2005 that one could manipulate the iPod to unauthorizingly 
copy files from a host computer to the iPod. He also made a proof-of-concept 
application called slurp.exe that when copied to the iPod was able to “slurp” files 
from a host Windows running computer, immediately after its connection to the USB 
port. The attack got the name that Abe Usher gave to it: “pod slurping”. The attack 
was generalized to all USB storage devices that were gaining popularity at the time. 
In 2010 Th. Kavalaris and V. Katos proposed a method of detecting a possible 
pod slurping attack [5]. They claimed that a forensics analyst might detect a pod 
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slurping attack by comparing the last accessed timestamps of the files with the time 
of insertion of the USB device. This could be done by acquiring the data from various 
operating system resources like the Windows registry. 
Most importantly, they claimed that the forensics analysis might even detect 
which specific USB device model was the one that conducted the attack. That can be 
done by comparing the transfer rate of the alleged attacked file to the characteristic 
transfer rate of the USB device. As seen in summarizing figure 4.2 a number of files 
are being accessed sequentially. This implies a possible pod slurping attack. This 
argument is enforced by the time of the insertion of a suspicious USB device. 
 
Fig. 4-2 An access pattern of a pod slurping attack [5] 
To further ground the argument the authors compare the transfer rate of 
those files to the characteristic transfer rate of a USB device. The speed of read and 
write for every USB device is specific and is dependent on the technologies utilized 
(ie. USB version, storage technology etc.). This characteristic transfer rate can be 
determined by testing.  
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Fig. 4-3 Comparing file access times with a USB’s characteristic transfer rate*5+ 
 
Figure 4.3 shows a scatter plot of access times of files and the corresponding 
regression line that defines the transfer rate. If that transfer rate matches the 
transfer rate of a USB storage device then that would be an additional clue to 
enforce the claim of the pod slurping attack using this specific USB device [Fig. 4.4] 
 
Fig. 4-4  Different characteristic transfer rates of different USB devices [5] 
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Based on the above criteria an application is proposed to automatically 
detect a possible pod slurping attack in a Windows system. 
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5. Pod slurping detection application  
 
5.1 Interface and usage 
  
The application has a simple wizard-like environment similar to many 
windows applications. The initial screen contains information about the application 
and how it is used. 
 
Fig. 5-1 Different characteristic transfer rates of different USB devices [5] 
Interaction with the user is needed in order to identify USB devices that do 
not belong to the legitimate user or are suspicious both based on the type of the 
device and on the time it was last plugged in. Hence, at the next screen, a list of all 
the devices ever connected to the system is presented to the user. Next to each USB 
device name there is a column with the timestamp of the last plug-in of the device. 
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This information is valuable, since the legitimate user usually suspects that the attack 
took place on a specific time period. Therefore, the user is prompted to check the 
suspicious devices.  
 
Fig. 5-2  USB devices with their corresponding plug in timestamp 
This information might even be enough for the user to conclude that no 
unauthorized device was logged by the system or no devices were found to be 
unknown or plugged in during the suspected period. 
The application only examines the possibility of an attack only with respect 
the USB devices chosen by the user. So the user narrows down the search and 
calculations made by the application. Someone might of course, choose all the 
devices and let the application do a complete investigation. 
After examining the files and their timestamps and comparing them against 
the timestamps of the suspected devices [Fig. 5.2], the application examines the 
system and presents its final report. 
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Fig. 5-3 The final report of the detection process 
The report gives two important pieces of information. The one is the 
percentage of files that seemed to have been massively copied. This percentage 
would usually be smaller as more time went by since the alleged attack. That is 
normally the case since the more a workstation is used the more files are usually 
accessed. When files are accessed, valuable information about the “chain of events” 
during the attack are lost. In the case that all files in question were accessed due to a 
backup procedure or similar function the detection algorithm will most possibly be 
unreliable [5]. 
The next information given is weather the copy sequence has started soon 
after the USB device was plugged in. This is usually the case when an attack takes 
place. The attacker starts the process manually or the USB devices trigger the 
autorun procedure that initiates the attack. 
It is also mentioned that the tool only intends to indicate possible attacks by 
presenting justifiable data. In no case are the results presented 100% certain since a 
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lot of factors affect the examination and the verdict drawn. A list of those factors are 
given below: 
1. Time span of workstation used between the suspected attack and the 
examination 
2. Backup processes taken place 
3. Logging procedures being disabled or enabled 
4. Clock consistency / modification 
5. Registry integrity 
It should also be mentioned that a sophisticated attack might also disable 
logging of events or even distort them to cover its tracks. Although the latter would 
require administrational rights and a better organized attack, however it is not 
impossible. The event of change in the status of those logging procedures might also 
be checked leading to conclude that a more sophisticated attack could be detected 
by a more sophisticated detection algorithm. 
 
5.2 The Windows Registry 
  
The most important aspect of the project is the algorithm used to detect 
weather the host PC has been a victim of the pod slurping attack. At first, 
information about the USB devices used by the host system has to be mined from 
the operating system, in our case Windows. The two main sources of information are 
the Windows’ registry and setupapi.log file [9]. While the later contains information 
mostly about the installation of a USB device, the registry contains information both 
at the first use of the device and on its most recent use. 
 The Windows’ registry is a hierarchical tree-like database that contains 
information about the system, devices attached to the system, applications installed, 
parameters of hardware and software, configuration and user details [10]. It was 
introduced to replace the many files that holed this information and formed a 
central source of configuration information. 
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Fig. 5-4 Structure and items of the Windows registry [10] 
The Registry consists of hives which are the equivalent of folders in the file 
system. Hives categorize registry information. They contain keys which contain 
values and subkeys. The values hold specific data and are the actual holders of 
configurational information.  Each value is able to have specific data, meaningful for 
the specific operating system and application [Fig. 5-4]. 
 The Registry information is spread across many files, while some parts of the 
registry is formed when the system boots. Most of these files reside in the 
\%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\config folder. HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM hive is 
held in a system file called “System”, while HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software hive is 
held in “Software”. Each users’ preferences and configuration resides in the users’ 
“Document and Settings” folder in NTUSER.DAT file *10+. 
 The most popular way of accessing the registry is through the build in 
Windows “Registry Editor”. The Registry Editor has a graphical environment and lets 
the user browse through all the registry keys [Fig. 5.4]. 
 Apart from the keys themselves, relative data are maintained just like the 
timestamps and in the file system. Hence, the Registry keys have a value associated 
with them called the “LastWrite” time that denotes the last time this key was 
modified. This information is quite valuable in forensics and is heavily used in the 
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detection algorithm as we will later see. The timestamp is held as a FILETIME object. 
A FILETIME objects denotes time as the number of 100 nanosecond intervals that 
passed since 1 January 1601. An easy way to extract the “LastWrite” attribute of a 
key is to highlight a key in the registry editor, right click and export as a text file [Fig. 
5-5]. 
 
Fig. 5-5 The LastWrite attribute of a registry key. 
The registry contains information about USB removable storage devices. A 
record of all the USB devices connected to the system is kept in 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\ControlSet00x\Enum\USBSTOR. Below this key 
there is a list of all the devices ever connected to the system. That includes pen 
drives, digital cameras, card readers etc. For each device there is a device ID, which is 
usually the serial number of the device. Since serial numbers are unique, there is an 
easy way to identify USB devices using this information. Not all USBs however, have 
a serial number [10]. 
Apart from the IDs, a lot of parameters are recorded, all of them during the 
installation of the USB device. One useful parameter, for the interface of the 
application created, is the “FriendlyName” value that gives a human readable name 
of the device, particularly useful for user identification.  
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Fig. 5-6 The USBSTOR registry key and the FriendlyName value 
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 Although the USBSTOR contains a lot of information about the USB devices, it 
is modified only at the creation of the key, that is at the first plug-in. There is another 
registry key that is updated every time a USB device is inserted. That is 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\DeviceClasses\{53f56307-
b6bf-11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}. This key contains all the USB devices as subkeys and 
the data of those subkeys are updated every time a USB device is plugged-in. By 
extracting the “lastWrite” attribute of that key one can retrieve the timestamp of the 
last plug-in of the USB device. 
 
Fig. 5-7 DeviceClass registry subkeys 
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5.3 The Detection Algorithm 
  
The main algorithm that detects weather the workstation in question has 
been a victim of a pod slurping attack consists of two phases. At the first phase the 
applications examines the “Documents” folder to calculate weather files of that 
folder has been sequentially copied. This is usually the case in a pod slurping attack 
i.e. the massive coping of files. When such a sequence is detected, the start of it is 
being compared with the time of the last plug-in of the suspected USB devices. If hat 
timestamps are close to each other then that is a clear indication of a pod slurping 
attack. 
 In the first phase of the detection all the files are red by the file system and 
are stored in an array with their attributes (file size, time last accessed etc). These 
files are sorted by the last accessed attribute in ascending order. This way the 
application will be ready to compare the timestamps.  
 
 
Fig. 5-8 Files in ascending “last accessed time” order 
 The size of each file is then divided by the interval time between each pair of 
files. This amount denotes the transfer rate which has to be almost the same, if files 
are copied to the same USB device.  
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Hence, if there is a sequence of files in which the transfer rate is the same or 
nearly the same, which is typically the case for files copied to the same USB device, 
then this sequence is considered an evidence of possible mass file copy. However, 
some time period may have passes since the attack and some files might be accessed 
again which will break the copy sequence. To incorporate such an event the 
algorithm calculates the percentage of files that belong to such a sequence and 
states that to the user for his additional evaluation. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5-9 Files forming a copy sequence 
The acceptable transfer rate in our case (in order for a sequence of files to 
comply to the “copy sequence” criteria) is set to no more than 10 bytes/sec. This 
limit is loose enough to include all the characteristic transfer rate of any USB device.  
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Fig. 5-10 Transfer rate of each file in the copy sequence 
 
At the second phase the sequence is compared against the plug-in of the 
candidate attacker. The algorithm also sets a loose criterion; A time interval of 30 
minutes is the maximum limit so as to include the possibility of a manual pod 
slurping attack. The minimum limit is set to -5 minutes which might be surprising 
since the copy sequence cannot start before the plug-in of the USB device. This is 
defined by design as testing showed that Windows might delay the update of the 
registry for some time leading to this, at first sight, oxymoron phenomenon.  
USB forensics in the pod slurping attack 
 
 
26   Papadopoulos Konstantinos   
 
Fig. 5-11 Time period acceptable to denote a USB device as suspicious 
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6. Testing the application 
6.1 Scenario 1 
 
After explaining basic principles of the application, some testing examples 
will be presented along with their outcome. The examples are set as scenarios with 
different parameters. At first a rather trivial example is set up. There are only a few 
files under examination that are copied to a USB Flash Drive. After that, the 
application is executed to test the results.  
 
Fig. 6-1 Files copied by a simulated pod slurping attack 
As seen in Fig. 6-1, the “Date accessed” property of the Windows file system 
(2nd column), shows that all files were copied nearly at the same time. Although the 
time shown is not accurate, a more accurate timestamp is held. The application 
examines all the files in the root of the Documents Folder. This includes all files 
weather they are hidden, system or read-only. An immediate execution will give 
unexpected results. The screen where the user chooses the suspicious USB devices 
does not seem accurate. Although the USB device were plugged in right before the 
beginning of the bulk copy, the USB Device plug-in time is not updated. 
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Fig. 6-2 USB Device data not updated (12/09/2011 while the current date is 
14/09/2011) 
 This is the case because Windows may postpone the update process of the 
timestamps for as long as an hour [5]. A cold restart might not be enough for the 
timestamps to be flushed to the secondary memory.  
It should also be mentioned here that Windows 7 do not update the “Date 
accessed” property by default. It should be manually enabled by the user before the 
attack takes place. Otherwise, the attack would not be able to be detected with the 
proposed method [11]. 
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Fig. 6-3 Final report detects the bulk copy but fails to detect the USB device 
After the registry is flushed the application reports accurate timestamps.  
 
Fig. 6-4 After the registry is flushed the application reports accurate timestamps. 
 
After choosing the suspected devices and getting the final report, the 
suspected USB is identified and reported since the beginning of the copy sequence 
and the plug-in times match. However one can observe that the percentage of the 
files copied has changed. This is because while using Windows, files are being 
accessed. In our case hidden file “desktop.ini” is accessed in boot time. 
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Fig. 6-5 verdict for the first scenario 
Secondly, comparing the plug-in timestamp with the “Last accessed” 
timestamp in Fig. 6-1, one can observe that the plug in seems to have taken place 
some minutes after the copying of the files has taken place. This phenomenon was 
explained earlier and is again due to the Windows inaccuracy in logging. 
Nevertheless, windows logging processes were not designed to fit the needs of a 
forensic investigation. 
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6.2 Scenario 2 
 Testing further we start by running the application in a folder where no 
deliberate mass copy has taken place. Since this is the case we expect to see a very 
low “copy sequence” percentage. Indeed at the first execution the application shows 
a very low percentage of the files seem to have been sequentially copied.  
 
Fig. 6-6 Running the application in an intact folder 
 Right after that, a pod slurping attack is simulated and the application is 
executed again to test its operation.  
 
 
Fig. 6-7 Choosing the suspected USBs 
USB forensics in the pod slurping attack 
 
 
32   Papadopoulos Konstantinos   
 
 
Fig. 6-8 Report shows Kingston DataTraveler as the attacker USB Device 
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7. Analyzing the code 
7.1 The algorithm 
  
In this part, a more deep view of the algorithm is attempted. The parts of the 
code itself, is more thoroughly explained. The analysis of the code is addressed to 
researchers wishing to dig into the details of the implementation of the application 
aiming at extending or modifying the algorithm or using the programming 
techniques for similar forensics applications. 
 The application is written in C#. The choice of a .net language was imperative 
since the forensics analysis is restrained in Windows systems. C# was chosen as an 
appropriate programming language for implementing low level and system 
functions, necessary for the forensics investigation. However, since the .net 
framework utilizes the Intermediate Language, any .net programming language 
could have been chosen, such as Visual Basic or other. 
 All the code is part of the podslurping namespace and the main functionality 
is part of the Porogram class. The Form1 class is used to incorporate the visual 
interface functionality. 
namespace podslurp 
{ 
    static class Program 
    { 
 
 At first, some unmanaged code is necessary to access the registry. With the 
term “unmanaged code” we refer to code bypassing the usual Common Language 
Runtime Virtual Machine and using directly binary Windows’ procedures. This is 
necessary to access the registry and retain registry’s parameters as the Last Access 
timestamps etc. 
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[DllImport("advapi32.dll", EntryPoint = "RegEnumKeyEx")] 
       public static extern int RegEnumKeyExA(UIntPtr hkey, uint index, 
StringBuilder lpName, ref uint lpcbName, IntPtr reserved, IntPtr lpClass, 
IntPtr lpcbClass, out long lpftLastWriteTime); 
 
[DllImport("advapi32.dll", EntryPoint = "RegOpenKeyEx")] 
        public static extern int RegOpenKeyExA(UIntPtr hKey, string subKey, int 
ulOptions, int samDesired, out UIntPtr hkResult); 
      
 
 The two functions incorporated are part of the advapi32.dll which includes an 
API for accessing the registry and security parameters of Windows. The 
“RegOpenKeyEx” is used to open a registry key and “RegEnumKeyEx” is used to 
enumerate subkeys of an open registry key.  
The application starts by showing the initial screen with instructions to the 
user. After that, the next screen is prepared. For that a full list of all the USB devices 
ever connected to the system has to be established. That is done by the 
populateUSBs() function. 
[STAThread] 
        static void Main() 
        { 
            Application.EnableVisualStyles(); 
            Application.SetCompatibleTextRenderingDefault(false); 
            Application.Run(new Form1()); 
 
            populateUSBs();             
        } 
 
In order to populate the list of the USB devices, data have to be retrieved 
from the registry. Hence, at first the registry key is defined and opened. A list of all 
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the subkeys containing the USB devices is made and stored in USBSubKeys string 
array. 
String basekey = @"SYSTEM\ControlSet002\Control\DeviceClasses\{53f56307-b6bf-
11d0-94f2-00a0c91efb8b}"; 
                RegistryKey registry = 
Registry.LocalMachine.OpenSubKey(basekey, false); 
                string[] USBSubKeys = registry.GetSubKeyNames(); 
 
Next the main part of the function takes place. A set of string manipulation 
commands draws the name of each USB device. Although the name of the USB 
device is found in the FriendlyName attribute, it is chosen to draw the name this way 
to avoid pairing the registry keys, which might lead to inconsistencies and errors. 
foreach (string key in USBSubKeys) 
                { 
                    if (key.IndexOf("USBSTOR") >= 0 && key.IndexOf(@"&Ven_") != 
0) 
                    { 
                        friendlyKey = key.Substring(key.IndexOf(@"&Ven_") + 4, 
key.Length - key.IndexOf(@"&Ven_") - 5); 
                        friendlyKey = friendlyKey.Substring(0, 
friendlyKey.IndexOf("#")); 
                        friendlyKey = friendlyKey.Substring(0, 
friendlyKey.IndexOf("&Rev")); 
                        friendlyKey = friendlyKey.Replace("&Prod_", " "); 
                        friendlyKey = friendlyKey.Replace("_", " "); 
                        friendlyKey = friendlyKey.Replace("&", " "); 
                        friendlyKey = friendlyKey.Replace("  ", " "); 
                        if (friendlyKey == " ") { friendlyKey = " Unknown"; } 
                        //allkeys = allkeys + friendlyKey + "\t\t"; 
                        USBdevices[devices] = friendlyKey.PadRight(30); 
 
After retrieving the human readable name, the registry subkeys is opened in 
order to retrieve last access time information.  
if (RegOpenKeyExA(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, basekey + "\\" + key, 0, KEY_READ, out 
hKeyLPIT) == 0) 
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                        { 
 
 The out parameter hkeyLPIT is a handle for the key in question. Using that 
handle the RegOpenKeyEx() function is called which enumerates all the keys’ 
subkeys. The subkeys are not actually needed, but the function is called in order to 
get the last parameter called lpftLastWriteTime. This variable carries the last access 
time in FILETIME format. After its conversion, the value is stored in the array 
USBtimes which has all the last access times for every USB device. 
 
if (RegEnumKeyExA(hKeyLPIT, 0, bufLPIT, ref dwBufSizeLPIT, (IntPtr)null, 
(IntPtr)null, (IntPtr)null, out writeTimeLPITs) == 0) 
                            {                                 
                                USBtimes[devices] = 
DateTime.FromFileTime(writeTimeLPITs); 
                                ++devices; 
                                                            } 
                            else 
                            { 
                                System.Console.WriteLine("Error code returned 
___" + RegEnumKeyExA(hKeyLPIT, 0, bufLPIT, ref dwBufSizeLPIT, (IntPtr)null, 
(IntPtr)null, (IntPtr)null, out writeTimeLPITs).ToString() + " " + 
bufLPIT.ToString()); 
                            } 
 
The above are executed for each USB device and after that the registry keys 
are closed to release the memory. 
if (devices>1)   {registry.Close();} 
                else 
                { 
                    MessageBox.Show("No USB Devices Found!"); 
                } 
 
The devices stored in USBdevices[] array and the times stored in USBtimes[] 
are presented in the second screen of the application. As soon as the user chooses 
the USB devices and clicks on the Next button the readFiles() procedure is called. As 
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its name denotes it is responsible to read the files of the “My Documents” folder 
(without the subfolders) and examine them in order to see if there is a sequence of 
files accessed sequentially.  
At first the home directory is defined in MyDocs variable. Next the GetFiles() 
function is called to get the file paths and names of every file in the “My Documents” 
folder. 
public static void readFiles() 
        { 
            String MyDocs = 
Environment.GetFolderPath(Environment.SpecialFolder.Personal); 
            string[] filePaths = Directory.GetFiles(MyDocs); 
            int numOfFiles = filePaths.Length; 
 
 The names are later used to get the FileInfo of the file which contains all the 
file attributes.  
int j,i=0; 
            foreach (String fileName in filePaths) 
            { 
                fileDetails[i] = new FileInfo(fileName); 
                ++i; 
            } 
 
 The File info are now placed in the fileDetails[] array. Next, the BubbleSort 
algorithm is used to sort in ascending Last Accessed time order. 
//Sort files in ascending LastAccessTime 
            FileInfo temp; 
            for (i = 1; i <numOfFiles; i++) 
            { 
                for (j = numOfFiles-1; j >= i; j--) 
                { 
                    if (fileDetails[j - 
1].LastAccessTime.CompareTo(fileDetails[j].LastAccessTime) > 0) 
                    { 
                        temp = new FileInfo(fileDetails[j - 1].ToString()); 
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                        fileDetails[j - 1] = new 
FileInfo(fileDetails[j].ToString()); 
                        fileDetails[j] = new FileInfo(temp.ToString()); 
                    } 
                } 
            } 
 
 The array now has to be examined for files being accessed sequentially. That 
is going to be done by comparing the Last Accessed times with the size of the file. 
That is indeed the transfer rate, and it should generally stay below a threshold in 
order for the algorithm to consider the files in question as sequentially copied. As 
soon as the application finds two of those files, it denotes the first one as first file of 
the sequence (firstFile variable) and runs ahead to see where the chain of 
sequentially accessed files goes. The number of those files in comparison with the 
total files of the folder (including hidden and system files) denotes the percentage of 
copied files. 
 
int filesCopied = 0; 
            const double maxTransRate = 0.1; 
 
double interval, firstfile_interval; 
            DateTime firstFile = new DateTime(); 
            firstFile = fileDetails[1].LastAccessTime; 
            for (i = 1; i < numOfFiles; i++) 
            {                    
                interval = fileDetails[i].LastAccessTime.Subtract(fileDetails[i 
- 1].LastAccessTime).TotalSeconds / fileDetails[i-1].Length; 
                firstfile_interval = 
fileDetails[i].LastAccessTime.Subtract(fileDetails[1].LastAccessTime).TotalMinu
tes; 
                if ((interval < maxTransRate) && (firstfile_interval < 240)) 
                { 
                    ++filesCopied; 
                    if (filesCopied == 1) 
                    { 
                        firstFile = fileDetails[i].LastAccessTime; 
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                    }  
                } 
            } 
 
            percFilesCopied = (filesCopied *100)/ (numOfFiles - 1); 
 
 It has to be clarified that the algorithm checks against the possibility of pod 
slurping attack against the whole MyDocuments folder. Alternation of the algorithm 
might be more efficient in detecting partial pod slurping attack etc. (See below: 
Considerations) 
 At the next phase the Last accessed time of the first file of the sequence is 
compared against the last plug-in times of the USB devices chosen by the user. The 
choices of the user are stored in checkedDevices array which is retrieved by the 
corresponding Form. If the last plug-in time is 5 minutes after or 30 minutes before 
the copy of the first file then the USB Device is considered suspicious and is reported 
accordingly. 
//Mark as suspected if plugged in at most half an hour before mass coping takes 
place 
foreach (int choice in checkedDevices) 
            { 
                DateTime firstFileClone; 
                firstFileClone = new DateTime(); 
                firstFileClone = firstFile; 
                if ((firstFile.Subtract(USBtimes[choice + 1]).TotalMinutes <= 
30) && (firstFile.Subtract(USBtimes[choice + 1]).TotalMinutes >= -5)) 
                { 
                    suspectedUSBs[choice+1]=true; 
                } 
            } 
 
 An array called suspectedUSBs is made to denote which of the USB devices 
fall under the above conditions. 
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7.2 The graphical interface 
  
To complete the reference to the code, we continue with a reference to the 
graphical interface of the application. The GUI consists of a Form that contains three 
panels, one for each screen. When one panel is active, the other two are not visible. 
This way the application flows from one screen to the other when the user clicks 
next button.  
public Form1() 
        { 
            InitializeComponent(); 
            this.panel2.Visible = false; 
            this.panel3.Visible = false; 
        } 
 
 
 When the start button is pressed at the initial screen the Form calls the 
populateUSBs() function. The data collected from the populateUSBs() function are 
being added to a checklist box so that the user put a checkmark to the ones he 
choses. The visible property is changed to change to the next screen. 
 private void button1_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            podslurp.Program.populateUSBs(); 
            int i=1; 
            while (podslurp.Program.USBdevices[i]!=null)  
            { 
                this.checkedListBox1.Items.Add(podslurp.Program.USBdevices[i] + 
" \t " + podslurp.Program.USBtimes[i]); 
                ++i; 
            }             
            this.panel1.Visible = false; 
            this.panel2.Visible = true; 
        } 
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 The next screen works in a similar way. When the “Next” button is clicked the 
Form passes the values of the checked USB devices to a property of the Program. 
Class. This property is used to apply the detection algorithm incorporated in the 
readFiles() function, which is called right afterwards. The data calculated by the 
radFiles() function are then drawn by the Form and presented in the next screen. 
Those are the suspectedUSBs[] along with the USBtimes[] arrays which contain all 
the devices that the algorithm found as suspicious and the percFilesCopied public 
variable which denotes the percentage of the files sequentially copied. Visibility 
properties are changed accordingly. 
 
private void button2_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            podslurp.Program.checkedDevices = 
this.checkedListBox1.CheckedIndices; 
            podslurp.Program.readFiles(); 
            this.textBox5.Text = "Percentage of files sequentially copied:" + 
podslurp.Program.percFilesCopied +"%\r\n"; 
            this.textBox5.Text += "Suspected USB Devices: \r\n"; 
            int i; 
            Boolean atLeastOne = false; 
            for (i = 1; i < 50; i++) 
            { 
                if (podslurp.Program.suspectedUSBs[i] == true) 
                { 
                    this.textBox5.Text += "    " + 
podslurp.Program.USBdevices[i] + " \t " + podslurp.Program.USBtimes[i] + 
"\r\n"; 
                    atLeastOne = true; 
                } 
            } 
            if (atLeastOne == false) { this.textBox5.Text += "None"; } 
            this.panel2.Visible = false; 
            this.panel3.Visible = true; 
        } 
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8. Conclusions 
  
Based on the above analysis and implementation some observations and 
conclusions have been drawn. Firstly we saw that, a lot of information about the 
usage of a workstation is kept in the registry and other files of the system. Those 
data are valuable for the forensics analyst. Having said that, it should also be noted 
that the usage data are not as refined and as precise as a forensics analyst would 
need for a complete analysis. Some forensics data, like timestamps etc, are not 
updated regularly and not precise. It seems that the registry was not designed having 
the forensics analysis in mind rather than the needs of the operating system itself 
 A second point regards the detection algorithm. A lot of discussion could be 
made about the scope and the strictness of the algorithm. The algorithm proposed in 
this dissertation tried to detect a pod slurping attack that copied a full directory. 
Other researches might define the attack in a different way and detect a partial 
attack, or an attack at a specific type of file, or conduct a more thorough 
examination both in terms of memory and in terms of timeframe. Such an analysis 
falls out of the scope of this dissertation.  
 Overall the aim of this essay was not to cover all aspects of the pod slurping 
attack, rather to implement an application which is a proof of the concept that such 
a forensics analysis is possible in an automatic way and conducted by an average 
user himself.  
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Appendix  
 
List of variables 
 
Variable Physical meaning 
checkedDevices Array containing the choices of the user 
devices Pointer of the USBdevices[] array 
fileDetails[] File properties such as Last accessed, size, Last modified, owners 
etc. 
filePaths[] Path and filenames of all the files in the folder 
filesCopied Files sequentially copied 
firstFile The file denoted as the first file of a sequence of sequentially 
copied files 
firstfile_interval The timestamp of the first file of the sequence 
firstFileClone A clone of the first file handle to be used for calculations 
hKeyLPIT Handle of a registry key 
Interval Time elapsed between the access  time of two files 
maxTransRate Maximum accepted transfer rate in sec/byte. If a file is copied in 
time larger than this then it is supposed to not be sequentially 
copied. 
MyDocs Full path of the “My Documents folder 
numOfFiles Number of files in the MyDocs folder 
percFilesCopied Percentage of filesof the folder that was sequencially copied  
suspectedUSBs[] USBs considered suspected bye the algorithm 
USBdevices[] Array of all the USB devices ever connected to the system 
USBtimes[] Last plug in time of every USB device in USBdevices[] 
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Code of Program.cs 
 
 
using System; 
using System.IO; 
using System.Collections; 
using System.Text; 
using System.Runtime.InteropServices; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.Linq; 
using System.Windows.Forms; 
using Microsoft.Win32; 
 
namespace podslurp 
{ 
    static class Program 
    { 
 
        public static UIntPtr HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE = new 
UIntPtr(0x80000002u); 
        const int KEY_READ = 0x20019; 
        public static String[] USBdevices = new String[50]; 
        public static DateTime[] USBtimes = new DateTime[50]; 
        public static Boolean[] suspectedUSBs = new Boolean[50]; 
        public static 
System.Windows.Forms.CheckedListBox.CheckedIndexCollection checkedDevices; 
        public static double percFilesCopied; 
        /// <summary> 
        /// The main entry point for the application. 
        /// </summary> 
        ///  
 
        [DllImport("advapi32.dll", EntryPoint = "RegEnumKeyEx")] 
        public static extern int RegEnumKeyExA(UIntPtr hkey, uint index, 
StringBuilder lpName, ref uint lpcbName, IntPtr reserved, IntPtr lpClass, 
IntPtr lpcbClass, out long lpftLastWriteTime); 
 
        [DllImport("advapi32.dll", EntryPoint = "RegOpenKeyEx")] 
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        public static extern int RegOpenKeyExA(UIntPtr hKey, string subKey, 
int ulOptions, int samDesired, out UIntPtr hkResult); 
         
        [STAThread] 
        static void Main() 
        { 
            Application.EnableVisualStyles(); 
            Application.SetCompatibleTextRenderingDefault(false); 
            Application.Run(new Form1()); 
 
            populateUSBs();             
        } 
 
        public static void readFiles() 
        { 
            String MyDocs = 
Environment.GetFolderPath(Environment.SpecialFolder.Personal); 
            string[] filePaths = Directory.GetFiles(MyDocs); 
            int numOfFiles = filePaths.Length; 
            int filesCopied = 0; 
            const double maxTransRate = 0.1; 
            FileInfo[] fileDetails = new FileInfo[numOfFiles]; 
 
             
            int j,i=0; 
            foreach (String fileName in filePaths) 
            { 
                fileDetails[i] = new FileInfo(fileName); 
                ++i; 
            } 
 
            //Sort files in ascending LastAccessTime 
            FileInfo temp; 
            for (i = 1; i <numOfFiles; i++) 
            { 
                for (j = numOfFiles-1; j >= i; j--) 
                { 
                    if (fileDetails[j - 
1].LastAccessTime.CompareTo(fileDetails[j].LastAccessTime) > 0) 
                    { 
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                        temp = new FileInfo(fileDetails[j - 1].ToString()); 
                        fileDetails[j - 1] = new 
FileInfo(fileDetails[j].ToString()); 
                        fileDetails[j] = new FileInfo(temp.ToString()); 
                    } 
                } 
            } 
 
 
            //Clculate iterval of last access time. DIvide by size. If rate 
is less that 0.1 then it might  
            //be copied massively. Count and calculate percentage of files 
of that feature. 
            double interval, firstfile_interval; 
            DateTime firstFile = new DateTime(); 
            firstFile = fileDetails[1].LastAccessTime; 
            for (i = 1; i < numOfFiles; i++) 
            {                     
                interval = 
fileDetails[i].LastAccessTime.Subtract(fileDetails[i - 
1].LastAccessTime).TotalSeconds / fileDetails[i-1].Length; 
                firstfile_interval = 
fileDetails[i].LastAccessTime.Subtract(fileDetails[1].LastAccessTime).Total
Minutes; 
                if ((interval < maxTransRate) && (firstfile_interval < 
240)) 
                { 
                    ++filesCopied; 
                    if (filesCopied == 1) 
                    { 
                        firstFile = fileDetails[i].LastAccessTime; 
                    } 
                } 
            } 
 
            percFilesCopied = (filesCopied *100)/ (numOfFiles - 1); 
 
            //Initialize suspected USBs 
            for (i=0; i<50; i++) {suspectedUSBs[i]=false;} 
 
USB forensics in the pod slurping attack 
 
 
Papadopoulos Konstantinos  49 
            //Mark as suspected if plugged in at most half an hour before 
mass coping takes place 
            //TimeSpan halfHour = new TimeSpan(0,30,0); 
            foreach (int choice in checkedDevices) 
            { 
                //Console.WriteLine("choice: " + choice); 
                DateTime firstFileClone; 
                firstFileClone = new DateTime(); 
                firstFileClone = firstFile; 
                if ((firstFile.Subtract(USBtimes[choice + 1]).TotalMinutes 
<= 30) && (firstFile.Subtract(USBtimes[choice + 1]).TotalMinutes >= -5)) 
                { 
                    suspectedUSBs[choice+1]=true; 
                } 
            } 
 
        } 
 
        public static void populateUSBs() 
        { 
            UIntPtr hKeyLPIT; 
            StringBuilder bufLPIT = new StringBuilder(255); 
            uint dwBufSizeLPIT = 255; 
            long writeTimeLPITs; 
            int devices = 1; 
 
 
            try 
            { 
                String basekey = 
@"SYSTEM\ControlSet002\Control\DeviceClasses\{53f56307-b6bf-11d0-94f2-
00a0c91efb8b}"; 
                String friendlyKey; 
                RegistryKey registry = 
Registry.LocalMachine.OpenSubKey(basekey, false); 
                string[] USBSubKeys = registry.GetSubKeyNames(); 
                foreach (string key in USBSubKeys) 
                { 
                    if (key.IndexOf("USBSTOR") >= 0 && 
key.IndexOf(@"&Ven_") != 0) 
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                    { 
                        friendlyKey = key.Substring(key.IndexOf(@"&Ven_") + 
4, key.Length - key.IndexOf(@"&Ven_") - 5); 
                        friendlyKey = friendlyKey.Substring(0, 
friendlyKey.IndexOf("#")); 
                        friendlyKey = friendlyKey.Substring(0, 
friendlyKey.IndexOf("&Rev")); 
                        friendlyKey = friendlyKey.Replace("&Prod_", " "); 
                        friendlyKey = friendlyKey.Replace("_", " "); 
                        friendlyKey = friendlyKey.Replace("&", " "); 
                        friendlyKey = friendlyKey.Replace("  ", " "); 
                        if (friendlyKey == " ") { friendlyKey = " Unknown"; 
} 
                        USBdevices[devices] = friendlyKey.PadRight(30); 
 
                        if (RegOpenKeyExA(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, basekey + 
"\\" + key, 0, KEY_READ, out hKeyLPIT) == 0) 
                        {   dwBufSizeLPIT = 255; 
                            if (RegEnumKeyExA(hKeyLPIT, 0, bufLPIT, ref 
dwBufSizeLPIT, (IntPtr)null, (IntPtr)null, (IntPtr)null, out 
writeTimeLPITs) == 0) 
                            { 
                                USBtimes[devices] = 
DateTime.FromFileTime(writeTimeLPITs); 
                                ++devices; 
 
                            } 
                            else 
                            { 
                                System.Console.WriteLine("Error code 
returned ___" + RegEnumKeyExA(hKeyLPIT, 0, bufLPIT, ref dwBufSizeLPIT, 
(IntPtr)null, (IntPtr)null, (IntPtr)null, out writeTimeLPITs).ToString() + 
" " + bufLPIT.ToString()); 
                            } 
 
                        } 
                        else 
                        { 
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                            System.Console.WriteLine("Error code returned 
>>>" + RegOpenKeyExA(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, basekey + "\\" + key, 0, KEY_READ, 
out hKeyLPIT).ToString()); 
                        } 
                    } 
 
                } 
                if (devices>1)   {registry.Close();} 
                else 
                { 
                    MessageBox.Show("No USB Devices Found!"); 
                } 
            } 
                catch (Exception ex) 
            { 
                MessageBox.Show(ex.ToString()); 
            } 
        } 
     } 
} 
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Code of Form1.Designer.cs 
 
 
namespace podslurp 
{ 
    partial class Form1 
    { 
        /// <summary> 
        /// Required designer variable. 
        /// </summary> 
        private System.ComponentModel.IContainer components = null; 
 
        /// <summary> 
        /// Clean up any resources being used. 
        /// </summary> 
        /// <param name="disposing">true if managed resources should be 
disposed; otherwise, false.</param> 
        protected override void Dispose(bool disposing) 
        { 
            if (disposing && (components != null)) 
            { 
                components.Dispose(); 
            } 
            base.Dispose(disposing); 
        } 
 
        #region Windows Form Designer generated code 
 
        /// <summary> 
        /// Required method for Designer support - do not modify 
        /// the contents of this method with the code editor. 
        /// </summary> 
        private void InitializeComponent() 
        { 
            System.ComponentModel.ComponentResourceManager resources = new 
System.ComponentModel.ComponentResourceManager(typeof(Form1)); 
            this.panel1 = new System.Windows.Forms.Panel(); 
            this.textBox2 = new System.Windows.Forms.TextBox(); 
            this.textBox1 = new System.Windows.Forms.TextBox(); 
            this.button1 = new System.Windows.Forms.Button(); 
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            this.panel2 = new System.Windows.Forms.Panel(); 
            this.textBox3 = new System.Windows.Forms.TextBox(); 
            this.checkedListBox1 = new 
System.Windows.Forms.CheckedListBox(); 
            this.button2 = new System.Windows.Forms.Button(); 
            this.panel3 = new System.Windows.Forms.Panel(); 
            this.textBox5 = new System.Windows.Forms.TextBox(); 
            this.textBox4 = new System.Windows.Forms.TextBox(); 
            this.button3 = new System.Windows.Forms.Button(); 
            this.panel1.SuspendLayout(); 
            this.panel2.SuspendLayout(); 
            this.panel3.SuspendLayout(); 
            this.SuspendLayout(); 
            //  
            // panel1 
            //  
            this.panel1.Controls.Add(this.textBox2); 
            this.panel1.Controls.Add(this.textBox1); 
            this.panel1.Controls.Add(this.button1); 
            this.panel1.Location = new System.Drawing.Point(-2, 2); 
            this.panel1.Name = "panel1"; 
            this.panel1.Size = new System.Drawing.Size(769, 529); 
            this.panel1.TabIndex = 0; 
            //  
            // textBox2 
            //  
            this.textBox2.BackColor = System.Drawing.SystemColors.Control; 
            this.textBox2.BorderStyle = 
System.Windows.Forms.BorderStyle.None; 
            this.textBox2.Font = new System.Drawing.Font("Microsoft Sans 
Serif", 12F, System.Drawing.FontStyle.Regular, 
System.Drawing.GraphicsUnit.Point, ((byte)(161))); 
            this.textBox2.Location = new System.Drawing.Point(116, 174); 
            this.textBox2.Multiline = true; 
            this.textBox2.Name = "textBox2"; 
            this.textBox2.Size = new System.Drawing.Size(554, 235); 
            this.textBox2.TabIndex = 2; 
            this.textBox2.Text = resources.GetString("textBox2.Text"); 
            this.textBox2.TextAlign = 
System.Windows.Forms.HorizontalAlignment.Center; 
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            this.textBox2.TextChanged += new 
System.EventHandler(this.textBox2_TextChanged); 
            //  
            // textBox1 
            //  
            this.textBox1.BorderStyle = 
System.Windows.Forms.BorderStyle.None; 
            this.textBox1.Font = new System.Drawing.Font("Microsoft Sans 
Serif", 20.25F, ((System.Drawing.FontStyle)((System.Drawing.FontStyle.Bold 
| System.Drawing.FontStyle.Italic))), System.Drawing.GraphicsUnit.Point, 
((byte)(161))); 
            this.textBox1.ForeColor = System.Drawing.Color.Green; 
            this.textBox1.Location = new System.Drawing.Point(14, 8); 
            this.textBox1.Multiline = true; 
            this.textBox1.Name = "textBox1"; 
            this.textBox1.Size = new System.Drawing.Size(743, 110); 
            this.textBox1.TabIndex = 1; 
            this.textBox1.Text = "\r\nPod Slurping Detector"; 
            this.textBox1.TextAlign = 
System.Windows.Forms.HorizontalAlignment.Center; 
            //  
            // button1 
            //  
            this.button1.Font = new System.Drawing.Font("Microsoft Sans 
Serif", 8.25F, System.Drawing.FontStyle.Bold, 
System.Drawing.GraphicsUnit.Point, ((byte)(161))); 
            this.button1.Location = new System.Drawing.Point(604, 477); 
            this.button1.Name = "button1"; 
            this.button1.Size = new System.Drawing.Size(106, 28); 
            this.button1.TabIndex = 0; 
            this.button1.Text = "Start"; 
            this.button1.UseVisualStyleBackColor = true; 
            this.button1.Click += new 
System.EventHandler(this.button1_Click); 
            //  
            // panel2 
            //  
            this.panel2.Controls.Add(this.textBox3); 
            this.panel2.Controls.Add(this.checkedListBox1); 
            this.panel2.Controls.Add(this.button2); 
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            this.panel2.Location = new System.Drawing.Point(-1, 1); 
            this.panel2.Name = "panel2"; 
            this.panel2.Size = new System.Drawing.Size(765, 530); 
            this.panel2.TabIndex = 1; 
            //  
            // textBox3 
            //  
            this.textBox3.BackColor = System.Drawing.SystemColors.Control; 
            this.textBox3.BorderStyle = 
System.Windows.Forms.BorderStyle.None; 
            this.textBox3.Font = new System.Drawing.Font("Microsoft Sans 
Serif", 12F, System.Drawing.FontStyle.Regular, 
System.Drawing.GraphicsUnit.Point, ((byte)(161))); 
            this.textBox3.Location = new System.Drawing.Point(51, 21); 
            this.textBox3.Multiline = true; 
            this.textBox3.Name = "textBox3"; 
            this.textBox3.Size = new System.Drawing.Size(631, 70); 
            this.textBox3.TabIndex = 2; 
            this.textBox3.Text = resources.GetString("textBox3.Text"); 
            this.textBox3.TextAlign = 
System.Windows.Forms.HorizontalAlignment.Center; 
            //  
            // checkedListBox1 
            //  
            this.checkedListBox1.Font = new System.Drawing.Font("Consolas", 
9.75F, System.Drawing.FontStyle.Regular, System.Drawing.GraphicsUnit.Point, 
((byte)(161))); 
            this.checkedListBox1.FormattingEnabled = true; 
            this.checkedListBox1.Location = new System.Drawing.Point(51, 
106); 
            this.checkedListBox1.Name = "checkedListBox1"; 
            this.checkedListBox1.Size = new System.Drawing.Size(631, 328); 
            this.checkedListBox1.TabIndex = 1; 
            //  
            // button2 
            //  
            this.button2.Font = new System.Drawing.Font("Microsoft Sans 
Serif", 8.25F, System.Drawing.FontStyle.Bold, 
System.Drawing.GraphicsUnit.Point, ((byte)(161))); 
            this.button2.Location = new System.Drawing.Point(604, 477); 
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            this.button2.Name = "button2"; 
            this.button2.Size = new System.Drawing.Size(106, 28); 
            this.button2.TabIndex = 0; 
            this.button2.Text = "Next"; 
            this.button2.UseVisualStyleBackColor = true; 
            this.button2.Click += new 
System.EventHandler(this.button2_Click); 
            //  
            // panel3 
            //  
            this.panel3.Controls.Add(this.textBox5); 
            this.panel3.Controls.Add(this.textBox4); 
            this.panel3.Controls.Add(this.button3); 
            this.panel3.Location = new System.Drawing.Point(1, 6); 
            this.panel3.Name = "panel3"; 
            this.panel3.Size = new System.Drawing.Size(765, 530); 
            this.panel3.TabIndex = 2; 
            //  
            // textBox5 
            //  
            this.textBox5.Font = new System.Drawing.Font("Microsoft Sans 
Serif", 12F, System.Drawing.FontStyle.Regular, 
System.Drawing.GraphicsUnit.Point, ((byte)(161))); 
            this.textBox5.Location = new System.Drawing.Point(29, 72); 
            this.textBox5.Multiline = true; 
            this.textBox5.Name = "textBox5"; 
            this.textBox5.Size = new System.Drawing.Size(690, 376); 
            this.textBox5.TabIndex = 3; 
            //  
            // textBox4 
            //  
            this.textBox4.BackColor = System.Drawing.SystemColors.Control; 
            this.textBox4.BorderStyle = 
System.Windows.Forms.BorderStyle.None; 
            this.textBox4.Font = new System.Drawing.Font("Microsoft Sans 
Serif", 21.75F, System.Drawing.FontStyle.Bold, 
System.Drawing.GraphicsUnit.Point, ((byte)(161))); 
            this.textBox4.Location = new System.Drawing.Point(51, 21); 
            this.textBox4.Multiline = true; 
            this.textBox4.Name = "textBox4"; 
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            this.textBox4.Size = new System.Drawing.Size(631, 39); 
            this.textBox4.TabIndex = 2; 
            this.textBox4.Text = "Final Report:"; 
            this.textBox4.TextAlign = 
System.Windows.Forms.HorizontalAlignment.Center; 
            //  
            // button3 
            //  
            this.button3.Font = new System.Drawing.Font("Microsoft Sans 
Serif", 8.25F, System.Drawing.FontStyle.Bold, 
System.Drawing.GraphicsUnit.Point, ((byte)(161))); 
            this.button3.Location = new System.Drawing.Point(604, 477); 
            this.button3.Name = "button3"; 
            this.button3.Size = new System.Drawing.Size(106, 28); 
            this.button3.TabIndex = 0; 
            this.button3.Text = "End"; 
            this.button3.UseVisualStyleBackColor = true; 
            this.button3.Click += new 
System.EventHandler(this.button3_Click); 
            //  
            // Form1 
            //  
            this.AutoScaleDimensions = new System.Drawing.SizeF(6F, 13F); 
            this.AutoScaleMode = System.Windows.Forms.AutoScaleMode.Font; 
            this.ClientSize = new System.Drawing.Size(767, 543); 
            this.Controls.Add(this.panel3); 
            this.Controls.Add(this.panel2); 
            this.Controls.Add(this.panel1); 
            this.Name = "Form1"; 
            this.Text = "Pod Slurping Detector"; 
            this.Load += new System.EventHandler(this.Form1_Load); 
            this.panel1.ResumeLayout(false); 
            this.panel1.PerformLayout(); 
            this.panel2.ResumeLayout(false); 
            this.panel2.PerformLayout(); 
            this.panel3.ResumeLayout(false); 
            this.panel3.PerformLayout(); 
            this.ResumeLayout(false); 
 
        } 
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        #endregion 
 
        private System.Windows.Forms.Panel panel1; 
        private System.Windows.Forms.Button button1; 
        private System.Windows.Forms.Panel panel2; 
        private System.Windows.Forms.Button button2; 
        private System.Windows.Forms.TextBox textBox2; 
        private System.Windows.Forms.TextBox textBox1; 
        private System.Windows.Forms.CheckedListBox checkedListBox1; 
        private System.Windows.Forms.TextBox textBox3; 
        private System.Windows.Forms.Panel panel3; 
        private System.Windows.Forms.TextBox textBox5; 
        private System.Windows.Forms.TextBox textBox4; 
        private System.Windows.Forms.Button button3; 
 
    } 
} 
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Code of Form1.cs 
 
 
 
using System; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.ComponentModel; 
using System.Data; 
using System.Drawing; 
using System.Linq; 
using System.Text; 
using System.Windows.Forms; 
 
namespace podslurp 
{ 
    public partial class Form1 : Form 
    { 
        
 
        
        public Form1() 
        { 
            InitializeComponent(); 
            this.panel2.Visible = false; 
            this.panel3.Visible = false; 
        } 
 
        private void Form1_Load(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
        } 
 
        private void button2_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            podslurp.Program.checkedDevices = 
this.checkedListBox1.CheckedIndices; 
            podslurp.Program.readFiles(); 
            this.textBox5.Text = "Percentage of files sequentially copied:" 
+ podslurp.Program.percFilesCopied +"%\r\n"; 
            this.textBox5.Text += "Suspected USB Devices: \r\n"; 
            int i; 
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            Boolean atLeastOne = false; 
            for (i = 1; i < 50; i++) 
            { 
                if (podslurp.Program.suspectedUSBs[i] == true) 
                { 
                    this.textBox5.Text += "    " + 
podslurp.Program.USBdevices[i] + " \t " + podslurp.Program.USBtimes[i] + 
"\r\n"; 
                    atLeastOne = true; 
                } 
            } 
            if (atLeastOne == false) { this.textBox5.Text += "None"; } 
            this.panel2.Visible = false; 
            this.panel3.Visible = true; 
        } 
 
        private void label1_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
 
        } 
 
        private void textBox2_TextChanged(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
 
        } 
 
        private void button1_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            podslurp.Program.populateUSBs(); 
            int i=1; 
            while (podslurp.Program.USBdevices[i]!=null)  
            { 
                
this.checkedListBox1.Items.Add(podslurp.Program.USBdevices[i] + " \t " + 
podslurp.Program.USBtimes[i]); 
                ++i; 
            }             
            this.panel1.Visible = false; 
            this.panel2.Visible = true; 
        } 
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        private void button3_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            this.Close(); 
        } 
    } 
} 
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